

## MR New Medium Reviews

*The increasing availability and decreasing cost of videos has prompted Military Review to introduce a new feature, in which we offer video reviews. Following is our inaugural video review. At this time we are soliciting reviews of recent military- or history-related videos. Reviews should follow the same guidelines as book reviews. Contact our book review editor or see our web site for more information.*

**VIETNAM: The Soldier's Story, vol. 2, episode 1, "Tet: The Battle for Hearts and Minds"** ABC Video, Brighton, VIC. Run time: 52 minutes. \$59.99 set.

This ABC News video about the Vietnam War intersperses combat footage and live interviews to document the conflict from a soldier's viewpoint. The footage is startling, dramatic and frequently graphic. The interviews are crisp and tightly woven into the narrative. The presentations, particularly the discussion about media roles and influence, are fair, balanced and historically accurate. The result is a truly gripping production and a first-class educational experience about life at the sharp edge of battle.

This episode covers the 1968 Tet offensive, during which thousands of soldiers, including American, South Vietnamese and Allied forces, engaged in heavy combat with North Vietnamese regular soldiers and Vietcong forces. The battle began on 31 January 1968 with simultaneous attacks across the country against over 100 cities, towns and hamlets, military bases and the US Embassy in Saigon. The offensive ended in the northern provinces when US Marines recaptured the citadel in the ancient capitol of Hue.

The video provides only a bare outline of the campaign, concentrating instead on the experiences of a few soldiers in key battles. In fact, about half the video concerns the firefight outside the embassy in Saigon. The narrative is absolutely compelling as a handful of military police, Marine guards and small fanatical bands of enemy soldiers fight their own terrible, private wars across embassy grounds. There are lessons here regarding small-unit combat, leadership and values from which every soldier can profit. It is the type of story you

would want all noncommissioned officers and lieutenants to see and remember as they lead their soldiers into battle.

The focus of the episode's second half is on the Marine operation to recapture Hue. Again, the focus is at small-unit level. The fighting offers tremendous insight into the nature of the human element in military operations in urban terrain. The influence of small-unit leadership was one of the most striking observations. "Gradually the leader we needed emerged," one veteran recalls. It had nothing to do with rank. Sometimes it was a private or sergeant, but the soldier with the skills gravitated to the lead. "It was the city kids," a Marine infantryman remembers—they knew how to move in the alleys and on roof tops. "The farm boys," he added, "we just followed." This video is a first-class production and a superb piece of military history. If this video is a typical example of what the multimedia is producing, we need to acknowledge it.

**LTC James J. Carafano, USA,**  
*Pentagon, Washington, D.C.*

## MR Book Reviews

**SHOCK ARMY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War** by Shane B. Schreiber. 164 pages. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 1997. \$55.00.

In World War I's final three months, the Allies hammered at the German army in a series of almost continuous attacks designed to bring peace before the winter's onset. During the climactic battles, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) played a leading role. The BEF's spearhead was the Dominion Corps—the Australians and Canadians. While Lieutenant General John Monash's Australians' achievements have been justifiably celebrated, Shane B. Schreiber believes the Ca-

nadians deserve the shock-troop title. Schreiber, an officer in the modern Canadian army, seeks to emphasize his countrymen's key role in attacking the German defense's toughest positions. The Canadians' successes and sacrifices highlight a peculiarly Canadian way of war.

The Canadian soldier had developed a reputation for dogged courage, while Canadian officers were noted for their pragmatic approach to warfare, which reached to their corps commander, Sir Arthur Currie. Currie and his subordinates demonstrated a genuine willingness to adopt practical solutions to the Western Front's toughest tactical combat problems.

Beyond such positive traits, the

Canadian Corps had important organizational advantages over other BEF units. Throughout 1918, each Canadian division maintained 12 infantry battalions; British divisions went to nine per division. Recognizing the need for battlefield firepower, the Canadians allocated one machinegun per 13 men in each division versus the ratio of one to 61 in other BEF units. While the British rotated divisions through corps at a rapid, random rate, the four Canadian divisions were kept together in a pure national corps. This corps had two additional artillery brigades over the normal corps allocation as well as a much larger complement of engineers. Surveying these advantages, Schreiber concludes the Canadian

Corps had a combat power equivalent to a small British army.

The Canadian Corps also had unique political clout. Currie had the power to veto what he believed were ill-considered orders. In 1918, the Canadian Corps commander asserted his role as the representative of a junior but sovereign ally. Nevertheless, Schreiber believes British Commander in Chief Douglas Haig used the Canadians in missions he knew would cost enormous casualties. He felt that because massive British losses would be unacceptable to the English public, the Canadians would be far more expendable. This view, with the Canadian Corps' outstanding fighting record, meant they were repeatedly called on to attack the strongest German positions.

Authors of 1993 US Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, will be gratified at how Schreiber describes the battles. Throughout his narrative, he uses the metaphor of *orchestration*. Much like the term is used in US doctrine, Schreiber's orchestration means the intricate cooperation of combined arms effects on the battlefield. In describing the Canadians' orchestration of battlefield effects, Schreiber reinforces the current scholarship that finds the birth of modern combined arms tactics on the Western Front in 1917 and 1918.

Against the Germans' sophisticated defensive tactics, the Canadians had to make an even more sophisticated offensive combination of artillery, tanks, close air support, infantry, engineers, armored cars and other weapons. The key combination was infantry and artillery. The Canadians were innovative in their centralized control of counterbattery fire and lavish in their use of ammunition. In the final battles, the Canadian Corps' average expenditure of shells per day was twice that of the American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne fighting.

I highly recommend Schreiber's book. He persuades the reader of the truly central role the Canadian Corps played in the last months of the war while allowing only a slight patriotic bias to show through. (He cannot

resist comparing his countrymen's accomplishments to those of the inexperienced Americans in the Meuse-Argonne Forest.) Schreiber also does a particularly fine job of examining tactical innovation in a period of intense combat. He may stretch the point by describing the last World War I battles as "maneuver warfare," but he certainly adds to our growing perception of that war as a turning point in the evolution of modern warfare.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,  
Combat Studies Institute,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



**THE CONCEIT OF INNOCENCE:**  
**Losing the Conscience of the West in the War against Bosnia** edited by Stjepan G. Mestrovic and Akbar S. Ahmed. 259 pages. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX. 1997. \$34.95.

*The Conceit of Innocence* is a collection of writings designed to demonstrate the callous indifference of certain Western nations toward the true situation in Bosnia. It claims there was a feigned commitment to moral principles that, in essence, helped worsen the crisis. Mestrovic, a professor of Sociology at Texas A&M University, and a noted scholar on Bosnia, has assembled a panel of like-minded, but no less weighty, contributors to add to the accusation. He contends and is ably supported in this argument that US foreign policy is driven by "postemotionalism" and that the unpleasant and unacceptable are justified away by attributing equal guilt to all sides in order to

excuse culpable inactivity.

While some of the sentiments may seem particularly harsh, there is little point in denying the failures of our own politicians in at least containing and perhaps providing an earlier solution to the appalling muddle that is now Bosnia. Vietnam's effect on Republican and Democrat foreign policy is well demonstrated and illustrates some of the reasons for inaction. Liberals attempt to recapture US innocence, and Conservatives seek only short, winnable wars.

The United States and its allies are now involved in a situation that may well have been solvable at the outset had more courageous political action been taken. So, at the very least, the reader will gain a greater understanding of a military problem now stretching well into the future and will become more aware of the prejudices the military will face in the region for years to come as a result of that early political failure.

My only concern with the book is that the authors' personal prejudices may have blurred their objectivity. Having served in Bosnia under the UN, I take issue with some of contributor Georgie Ann Geyer's criticism of General Michael Rose. In classical journalistic style, and without properly acknowledging Rose's subordination to UN control, Geyer claims he could have stopped the war. Brad K. Blitz's essay criticizes the detachment of academics, which he feels led to a failure to provide proper direction. However, voicing this criticism inadvertently draws attention to his lack of objectivity.

Most of the articles are of serious academic interest and provide detailed analyses of subjects ranging from ethnic cleansing to the formulation of US foreign policy in the region and its linkage to appeasement policies toward Russia and Serbia. There is also a fascinating study by Chandler Rosenberger on the origins of Serbian nationalism.

Taken as a whole, the book provides a superb analysis of the debacle that is Bosnia. Readers may be uncomfortable with some of the criticism of our leaders and their formu-

lation of foreign policy, but they will recognize many of the errors authors make. Despite some essays' lack of objectivity, I recommend that anyone with a professional interest in the region read this book.

**MAJ E.H.R. Marlow, UK,**  
*Command and General Staff*  
*College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*


**THE MEXICAN WAR CORRESPONDENCE OF RICHARD SMITH ELLIOTT** edited by Mark L. Gardner and Marc Simmons. 304 pages. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK. 1997. \$20.97.

This amazing work, depicting a little-known military expedition in an under-studied war, brings to life a 19th-century campaign as seen through a junior officer's eyes. Richard Smith Elliott, a newspaper writer and editor who, at the start of the Mexican-American war, was elected a lieutenant in a company of Missouri volunteers, used his military duty as an opportunity to report on the progress of General Stephen Watts Kearny's Army of the West as it marched from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to Santa Fe, New Mexico Territory. Described by a historian as "one of the earliest American war correspondents," Elliott did his job well, writing dispatches for the St. Louis, Missouri, *Reveille*. His 70 field reports shed insight on the expedition and are richly entertaining. They combine to form a sort of military travelogue.

Although it would strike any modern-day soldier as a strange arrangement, Elliott intended all along to report on the expedition's progress while also serving as a volunteer officer, which he did mainly to "acquire a sort of right to talk against the war in the future." His reports begin early in his company's—the Laclede Rangers—formation. He described the hasty nature of the raising and outfitting of the mostly volunteer army (the only regular forces attached were several companies of the First US Dragoons). He honestly discusses the volunteers' shortcomings in discipline and military knowledge, which he found wanting

when compared with regulars.

Although a volunteer himself, he leaves no doubt about which side he takes in the 19th-century debate about the quality and use of volunteers. He complains that he is "heartily disgusted with the volunteer service" because of the officers' lack of ability and military proficiency. Elliott also criticizes the government for neglect and lack of an overall strategic campaign plan and for failing to adequately support the army in the field. These are astonishing criticisms for a serving officer to make at any time.



Elliott's position allowed an inside view to some common problems of a 19th-century field army. In numerous dispatches during the first eight months of the campaign, he describes the army's withering as it loses hundreds of men to sickness, even though Santa Fe fell without bloodshed. By March 1847, nine months into the campaign, Elliott wrote of the high incidence of scurvy because of the lack of fresh meat and vegetables. The losses were so severe that Elliott's writings become quite somber during the campaign's latter months, even when the army had won two decisive battles. Elliott heaps indignation on the Mexicans when he recounts the massacres that began the revolt in Taos and Mora, New Mexico Territory, where the acting governor and several other Americans were tortured and killed. The difficulties of the campaign wore Elliott down.

Editors Mark L. Gardner and Marc Simmons superbly enhance Elliott's insightful and often witty letters. They understand he is the book's star and give him full play. Endnotes help put Elliott's comments in perspective without intruding on his reports. This is an excellent book, although a map detailing some of the intratheater operations Elliott describes would have been helpful.

**MAJ Todd Laughman, USA,**  
*On-Site Inspection Agency/IOSM,*  
*Dulles, Virginia*

**GRANT RISES IN THE WEST: The First Year, 1861-1862, and From Iuka to Vicksburg, 1862-1863,** by Kenneth P. Williams. Vol. 1, 585 pages; Vol. 2, 615 pages. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE. 1997. \$25.00 each.

These two volumes are reprints of two volumes from Kenneth P. Williams' seminal work *Lincoln Finds a General* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1950). Mark Grimsley's and Brooks D. Simpson's introductions provide a succinct overview of Williams' strengths and weaknesses as a historian and of his treatment of Ulysses S. Grant. For Williams, Grant was *the* general of the Civil War—the one by which all others are to be measured. For a more balanced treatment of Grant's virtues and faults a reader must look elsewhere.

That being said, the two books' merits are considerable. Williams' breadth and depth of detail, with analysis, of the Western Campaign can only be described as awesome. The reader is taken across the panorama of a vast theater that stretched from the Cumberland Gap in Tennessee to the Kansas prairies and involved two major as well as several minor battles.

Williams does not spend much time describing actual battles. He builds a rich mosaic from the events that influenced the where and when of major actions as well as some events that may have been mere distractions. The narrative is larded with the real business of organizing, equipping, training and campaigning with a citizen army. Williams details

the administration of these armies, the development and operation of a logistics system and the oversight of a civilian population that varied from being friendly, hostile or mixed.

Williams impresses the reader with the strategic importance of the South's great river systems, the Navy's crucial role in securing these rivers and the tactical and logistic support the Navy provided. The railroads' role was even more important. Williams shows how Confederate raids, particularly those by Confederate Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan, against Union lines of communications constrained Union armies.

Despite having been written more than 40 years ago, these books have a vitality that makes them enjoyable reading even now. Their accuracy and depth should make them essential reading for any military historian, Civil War buff or military professional.

Wars are not always fought with ample resources. Nor will generals always have the luxury of concentrating solely on strategy and tactics. They must often address situations outside the purely "military" realm. Inevitably, there will be future wars that involve campaigning over vast areas inhabited by civilians who exhibit varying degrees of friendliness or hostility. Williams provides a lesson in how Grant and other Union commanders addressed these problems.

**COL Wayne Kohlwes,**  
*USAR, Retired,*  
*Signal Mountain, Tennessee*

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**RED TAILS, BLACK WINGS:**  
**The Men of America's Black Air Force**  
by John B. Holway. 345 pages. Yucca Tree Press, Las Cruces, NM. 1997. \$22.95.

John B. Holway has written an interesting and often riveting book focusing on World War II's famous Tuskegee Airmen and their quest to fly in defense of their country. The work is replete with interesting vignettes and colorful stories on these pioneering air warriors who not only had to face tough Nazi aviators in the

air but also had to fight for their rights on the ground in America and the Army.

The book begins with an interesting overview of African-American military contributions and roles in the maturing US military establishment. The story then segues into a description of the first generation of black aviators in the dynamic period following the Wright brothers' first successful flight. Pioneers of black civil aviation, such as Bessie Coleman, James Herman Banning, Cal Rogers, C. Alfred "Chief" Anderson and others, are richly treated, and the reader



quickly discovers that the love of flying knows no color boundary.

The United States was clearly unprepared to wage a two-front war on a global scale on its entry into World War II after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Army Air Corps had to rapidly expand in order to perform a plethora of missions. Unfortunately, many of America's most promising African-Americans who attempted to become Army Air Corps cadets were denied an opportunity to serve because of the widespread belief that blacks did not possess the native intelligence, fortitude, ability or bravery to be combat pilots. It was believed they could be of better service to the nation by serving in support branches. The book brings to light first lady Eleanor Roosevelt's efforts to convince President Franklin D. Roosevelt to allow the Tuskegee "experiment" to take

place. The idea that blacks could not perform well as combat pilots was soon proven ludicrous by the superlative pilots who were trained under the inspiring leadership of Benjamin O. Davis Jr., the only black West Point graduate on active duty.

Trained to a fine edge, the airmen were able to prove their worth in combat in North Africa, Italy, France, Yugoslavia and, later, Germany. The famous Red Tail Fighter Squadron never lost a bomber to enemy fighters—a testament to the black pilots' discipline and Davis' no-nonsense leadership. The Red Tails garnered an enviable combat record and were awarded a Presidential Unit Citation. Despite frequent racial slights by senior Army officials and displays of discrimination by numerous others, the officers and men were in the forefront of changing American racial perceptions and paving the way for an integrated Armed Forces.

Holway interviewed many Tuskegee veterans, and the book is filled with colorful tales of aerial combat and candid reflections on the changing state of US racial relations. In one instance, a young black draftee requested to be sent to meteorology school. His commander doubted he could do the necessary integral and differential calculus, skew curves and complex computations. Eventually, despite the commander's misgivings, he was allowed to go. The draftee did so well he was kept at the school as an instructor. Eventually the commander learned that the man he thought incapable of doing the math necessary for meteorology tasks in reality, before being drafted, had already received his Ph.D. in mathematics from the University of Chicago. Sadly, such underestimation was common.

*Red Tails, Black Wings*, while enjoyable and easy to read, is not a scholarly historical study. It is, rather, an amalgamation of fascinating oral histories tied together in an informal history of the Tuskegee Airmen and of the combat exploits of the superlative Red Tail squadron. Holway has produced an entertain-

ing book that would be a fine addition to any military professional's reading list and would be enjoyed by any audience.

MAJ James P. Herson Jr., USA,  
XVIII Airborne Corps,  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

**THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948-60: The Domino that Stood by** Donald Mackay. 174 pages. Brassey's, Washington, DC. 1997. \$29.95.

"The Emergency," as it is known in Malaysia, has long since passed. The occasional reminder, like the recent Muslim disturbances along the Thai-Malaysian border, brings floods of memories of a much more dangerous time. As a reminder of the border's problems, books are occasionally released that examine the conflict and invoke thought because questions remain; for instance, why did the communist insurgency never succeed in Malaya as it did elsewhere?

Author Donald Mackay was a planter during the emergency, served as a reservist and has firsthand experience. He also consulted the normal array of books on the period, and his analysis is not much different from others. Everyone cites the same reasons for what occurred or did not occur. The difference in viewpoints comes in selecting which of the major reasons for the Government of Malaya's (GM's) success or Communist Party of Malaya's (CPM's) failure the writer believes to be paramount.

The reasons for the GM's success and the CPM's failure are well heralded. Among them are poor preparation, inadequate supply, the concentration of the Chinese population into hamlets, the booming Malayan economy, the failure of the Malay people to join the insurgency and the intelligence/propaganda effort—to name just a few.

The one element that sets Mackay's book apart from others on the subject is his insistence that a major element often overlooked by others is the performance of an array of excellent young national servicemen being led by quality junior officers. The au-

thor takes up the case for small-unit action.

The CPM was deep in the jungle. Major units floundered around and were ineffective. What put the CPM at a disadvantage was aggressive and sustained GM patrols that drove the CPM deeper and deeper into isolation where units could not sustain themselves. Once a base camp, with its supplies, was lost, the CPM could not replace it.

The GM's advantage was having superior supply lines. However, the practice of resupply, evacuation and insertion by helicopters was actually a disadvantage at times because it alerted the CPM to the GM's locations. The GM operated deep, surprised enemy camps, destroyed gardens hidden from aerial view and conducted ambushes. With the GM's pervasiveness, tenacity and skill, the CPM was driven farther and farther into the jungle and eventually into Thailand.

For those who believe in empowering junior officers and teaching independent action and thinking, this book provides another case for their argument.

Peter Charles Unsinger,  
San Jose State University,  
San Jose, California

**THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations** edited by John T. Fishel. 244 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1997. \$69.00.

Arguably the greatest dialogue within the US Armed Forces since 1989 involves the search for a theory of peace operations. Peace operations occur far more frequently in American military history than combat operations. What the military lacks, however, is a theoretical concept that explains the peace operations phenomenon. In *The Savage Wars of Peace*, John T. Fishel and other informed political scientists and historians frame and test such a concept.

The book introduces and explains the Max Manwaring Paradigm. Colonel Manwaring served as deputy director of the Small Wars Operations

Research Directorate (SWORD) within the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). While in that capacity, he developed his paradigm, which is also called the SWORD model.

Manwaring used an analytical technique to identify 72 variables common to peace operations. Those variables are categorized into seven dimensions: Unity of Effort, Host-Government Legitimacy, Degree of Outside Support to Insurgents, Supporting Actions of Intervening Power, Military Actions of Intervening Power, Host-Government Military Actions and Actions versus Subversion. These seven dimensions



eventually found their way into the 1994 US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations*, albeit modified, as the "principles of peace operations."

Various authors compare the Manwaring Paradigm with historical peace operations data from the Cold War to the present, hoping to disprove all or part of the theory by showing there is a lack of evidence to support each of its dimensions. In case after case, to varying degrees, the theory holds true, supporting—at least for the moment—Manwaring's classification of the seven dimensions relevant to peace operations. As an officer who participated in one "savage war of peace," I highly recommend this theoretical and practical work to those who are to shape future US peace operations.

LTC Walter E. Kretchik, USA,  
Combat Studies Institute,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**VIETNAM SHADOWS: The War, Its Ghosts and Its Legacy** by Arnold R. Isaacs. 256 pages. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD. 1997. \$25.95.

In 1983, Arnold R. Isaacs wrote an angry, sorrowful and impassioned book about the American defeat in Indochina titled *Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD), which reflected his experiences and considered thought as a war correspondent who was in Indochina between 1972 and 1975. In *Vietnam Shadows: The War, Its Ghosts and Its Legacy*, Isaacs has written a compelling book that is part of the historiographical process of placing the Vietnam War in the context of late 20th-century American history. The book—short and rich—covers such topics as the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial, Vietnam veterans, the so-called Vietnam generation, the effects the Vietnam War has had on public policy, the POW-MIA myth, teaching and learning about the Vietnam War, new immigrants from Indochina and ghosts to be exorcised. The book also has an appended source list and a perceptive bibliographic essay. As is obvious from its title and contents, the work is concerned with the context and effects of the war.

Isaacs also discusses the lingering antagonism between veterans and those who stayed home, and he points out, as earlier scholars have, that the Vietnam War, like most American wars, was fought by lower socioeconomic groups. The still-existing divisions between those who fought and those who did not are, for the most part, based on social class. The conscription system's numerous loopholes, and the military itself, offered middle- and upper-class men a way out of the war. Thirty years later, there is great moral confusion among those who took advantage of the system and the alienation and bitterness of those who did fight in the unpopular war.

Isaacs calls the MIA-POW issue "The Myth." This title signals his conclusions, and he relates the many scams and hoaxes carried out by the "mythmakers." That the issue lies at

the center of postwar Vietnamese-American relations is a conundrum he considers and tries to explain. He concludes there has been a massive media and political failure to deal with this subject in an intelligent way, which has given mythmakers full reign.

Isaacs also traces the Vietnam War's influence on American foreign policy, such as the twists and turns in regard to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama, Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia. However, the points Isaacs raises only underscore the historical reality of the deep gulf between political and military decision makers about the most effective ways to use military force in foreign policy. Vietnam only widened the already-existing divide.

Isaacs' discussion of Vietnamese social and political issues is compelling but too short. He devotes only a single chapter to Vietnam's own civil war, within which he also writes about the Vietnamese immigration experience in the United States and contemporary Vietnam and how the war continues to affect it.

Isaacs' chapter on teaching college courses about Vietnam and the war is especially enlightening. He draws on his own experiences and the teaching materials currently available. He outlines the difficulties in presenting the very different American society that existed then and explaining it to students who were not born when the events occurred. He notes, and I confirm his statements from my own extensive university teaching experience, that students usually know very little but have very strong opinions about the war, are singularly oblivious to the fact that the war was about Vietnamese issues and are unwilling to accept the reality of American failure in the war.

If the reader knows little about the Vietnam War, this book is a good place to begin. If the reader already has an understanding of the issues involved, it is a good place to find a nuanced, balanced perspective of the war.

Lewis Bernstein, *Combined Arms Center History Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

**THUNDER ON THE DNEPR: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg** by Bryan I. Fugate and Lev Dvoretzky. 416 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1997. \$27.95.

Since World War II, certain basic beliefs have guided Western historians regarding the Eastern Front:

- The Soviets, particularly Joseph Stalin, ignored or disbelieved Western intelligence they received concerning Germany's preparation for an imminent attack.

- A combination of Adolf Hitler's interference with overall operations and the deplorable weather conditions during the winter of 1941 stopped the Army Group Center just shy of Moscow.

- If Hitler and the weather had not interfered, Moscow could have been taken, possibly causing the Soviet Union to capitulate or, at least, significantly altering the Eastern Front Campaign's course specifically and the war's course in general.

Bryan I. Fugate and Lev Dvoretzky turn these beliefs on their heads. Using sources and archive materials only recently available, the authors maintain that both Stalin and the Soviet high command were not caught by surprise. They had, in fact, developed a highly secret and extremely innovative plan—including conducting a series of complex war games to test possible scenarios—to meet this expected event. This plan addressed the Germans' and Soviets' weaknesses and strengths.

The plan was not created by any one individual and was not without flaws. In the end, it was implemented even though it contained serious mistakes. The plan's greatest strength was its basic simplicity, and the plan achieved what was needed—"it worked." As the authors say, "It was, under the circumstances, probably the only plan that could save the country from suffering a total and ignominious defeat."

This book is divided into three sections, each of which can stand alone. The first section examines military planning and the Soviet Union's preparedness from the time of Germany's victory over France in 1940 to early 1941. The second sec-

tion describes each side's actions at their initial encounter. The authors compare the opponents' strategies and maneuver and contend that actions involving Army Group Center were not caused by Hitler's interference and blundering but, rather, by the deliberate positioning of Russian forces. The authors further contend that this eventuality was planned for, in major part, by war-game participants' actions during January and February 1941. The third section summarizes the results both sides achieved—results derived from both success and failure in strategy. Fugate and Dvoretzky conclude that after being stopped before reaching Moscow, "Germany had no hope of winning the war on the Eastern Front."

With so much new information becoming available to scholars and historians from previously secret Soviet archives, the authors' thesis is nowhere near so unbelievable as it may have been even a few short years ago. For those who want to know more about the Eastern Front, this book is a good beginning.

MAJ Richard D. Koethe III,  
USAR, 3410th Strategic Military  
Intelligence Production Detachment,  
Millington, Tennessee

**THE UNION SOLDIER IN BATTLE: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat** by Earl J. Hess. 244 pages. University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS. 1997. \$29.95.

In *The Union Soldier in Battle*, Earl J. Hess attempts to explain not only how the Union soldier faced combat but also how he continued to do so in the face of seemingly overpowering obstacles. Hess prefaces his work by categorically stating that "it is not a fully developed study of soldier morale." Instead, it is an "interpretive essay." Hess examines the experience of battle, using soldiers' letters and diaries and unit histories, all of which are often quite graphic, and an extensive description of the nature of combat itself.

Hess uses the same sources to show the motivating factors that caused soldiers to endure and triumph

over combat. He examines all facets of motivation—from religion to ideology; community spirit and comradeship; support from those at home, documenting the fears they faced while tending homesteads, businesses and families; and society's impact and expectations. Hess also emphasizes the importance of older Civil War studies, many of which were written before a comprehensive database of primary literature and source materials was available. He looks at veterans' (survivors') postwar attitudes and perceptions to determine what, if anything, changed in hindsight.

Hess also deliberately chose to study only the Union soldier because he "wanted to study the experiences of a successful army." While hastening to add that he meant no insult to the Confederate soldiers, he emphasizes that each side fought for profoundly different reasons and, therefore, each dealt with outcomes markedly dissimilar.

While reading this book, I was struck by the sincere thoughts and desires that fueled the Union soldier to not only meet the horrors that faced him in combat but to succeed. Many of these same motivations are at the forefront of what makes a successful army today. This work is worthwhile for today's military professional not only because it is an interesting Civil War study, but also because of the impact it could have as lessons learned for shaping our 21st-century Army.

MAJ Richard D. Koethe III,  
USAR, 3410th Strategic Military  
Intelligence Production Detachment,  
Millington, Tennessee

**THE VIETNAM LOBBY: The American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975**, by Joseph G. Morgan. 229 pages. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC. 1997. \$39.95.

Joseph G. Morgan examines the role the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) have played in influencing and shaping US public and government opinion about that country. Although he calls the organization "ineffective," he writes that it "is

a group that merits attention." He gives four reasons:

- It provided "insights into the problems a private association faces in persuading the government and public to accept its views."
- It provided answers to questions about the influences the two governments were able to exert on each other through the organization.
- It shed light on the activities of citizens who supported US intervention in Vietnam.
- It provided "an opportunity to examine assumptions" that guided US policy for several years.

All of these are worthwhile goals. Unfortunately, examining the activi-



ties of the AFV is a slender reed on which to rest their attainment.

Morgan's conclusion is that the AFV was part of a broad, societywide coalition, stretching from the far right to the moderate left, that supported the Cold War in all of its manifestations. The coalition's backers were anti-communists who regarded the Cold War as a continuation of the ideological war with Fascism and Nazism.

The AFV was a private-interest group formed to put pressure on the US government to follow a policy it was already following and had no intention of backing away from. It, along with most of American society, did not question the underpinnings of Cold War politics. When President John F. Kennedy was searching for new policy direction and sending more US advisers to Vietnam, the AFV was silent

because it was paralyzed by internal discord—its part of the Cold War consensus was breaking down.

Although Morgan accomplishes his main goals in writing this book, one must question whether reading the book is worthwhile. It is well written, and the sources are appropriately cited, but the book's thesis never inspires interest. Morgan's main points have been discussed by others (Michael Adas, Larry Berman, Lloyd C. Gardner, George McTurnan Kahin, William J. Ducker) in more depth and detail and with greater insight. Basically, the book is a doctorate thesis that should never have been published. At most, although well written and researched, it should only have been published as an article in a scholarly journal. It offers nothing new.

Lewis Bernstein, *Combined Arms  
Center History Office,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

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
**MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY: A Century of Wilsonianism & its Totalitarian Challengers** by Amos Perlmutter. 194 pages. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC. 1997. \$29.95.

Amos Perlmutter is no neophyte in the study of international relations and power politics. The author of nearly a dozen books about modern leadership, political organization and military strategy, Perlmutter is well qualified to examine the legacy of President Woodrow Wilson, whose noble purpose of making the world safe for democracy brought America into World War I. Unfortunately, Wilson's vision of a planet free from conflict not only proved fleeting, it actually rapidly disintegrated into another international arms buildup that led to even greater slaughter.

This well-researched and thought-provoking assessment of Wilson's legacy may reshape readers' perceptions of the idealistic leader. The causes for Wilson's failure lie in his inability to see that vision detached from practical realities is doomed. As Perlmutter demonstrates, Wilson's high-minded idealism was not backed by strong political and military measures that would have made it clear that the United States had the will to

follow through on its president's promises. By contrast, Wilson's successors on the international scene either grasped this principle intuitively or came reluctantly to understand the necessity to exercise force in the name of freedom.

Perlmutter demonstrates how that era's three principal world leaders—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin—understood the linkage between ideology and power, and how three distinct world orders came to challenge one another for supremacy on the international scene.



Through careful analysis of the contrasting visions of social and political organizations, Perlmutter explains why both a strong military and the resolve to use it are necessary for a great nation to impose its world view on others. In some ways this sounds like a Hobbesian vision of a universe where only the strong survive. Perlmutter is willing to acknowledge this ugly reality, but he is also convinced that even the noblest forms of democracy cannot be sustained unless a nation is prepared to defend its beliefs, even if lives must be sacrificed in doing so.

Fortunately for contemporary readers, Perlmutter's study of the failure of Wilson's idealism is no mere antiquarian exercise. At the end of a century when the United States is left as the only real superpower, *Making the World Safe for Democracy* can serve as a cautionary tale highlighting the need for continued military preparedness and

the political will to use it wisely. These are lessons that thoughtful professionals, both military and professional, would do well to heed.

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno,  
USA, Retired,  
Wyomissing, Pennsylvania

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**“ONE OF THE MOST DARING OF MEN”: The Life of Confederate General William Tatum Wofford** by Gerald J. Smith. 242 pages. Southern Heritage Press, Murfreesboro, TN. 1997. \$16.95.

In the latest addition to the *Journal of Confederate History* series, Gerald J. Smith examines the life of Brigadier General William Tatum Wofford, the commander of the 18th Georgia Regiment during the Civil War. Most of Wofford's battles were fought in the Eastern Theater and in the 1863 Chickamauga-Chattanooga Campaign. Although Wofford was a humble and gracious soldier, he established a reputation as a superb regimental and brigade commander. He also played an instrumental role in the history of Georgia from the time of the Mexican War of 1847-1848 to the controversial 1877 Georgia Constitutional Convention.

For this biography, Smith drew from the Wofford papers and related manuscript collections and consulted period newspapers and diaries, letters and memoirs of Wofford's friends and fellow soldiers. When combined with *The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, the result is a well-researched biography.

Wofford's high-water mark occurred on the Battle of Gettysburg's second day. His brigade was part of Lafayette McLaw's division, which attacked down Wheatfield Road, pushing the Union line back a mile. Wofford's attack included some of the most intense fighting in the war. So well did he lead his brigade at Gettysburg and in the Battle of the Wilderness that General Robert E. Lee named him “one of Georgia's best soldiers.”

In late 1864, Wofford left the Army of Northern Virginia and was reassigned to the Department of North Georgia to command the state's reserve forces. His principal duties involved capturing guerrillas and deserters and maintaining



peace and order in northern Georgia. Wofford was also to distribute food to Georgia's starving population. Following Lee's surrender at Appomattox, Wofford also surrendered, agreeing to essentially the same terms Grant offered Lee.

Smith's most intriguing description of Wofford's life is his narrative of Wofford's postwar career. A popular war hero, Wofford easily won election to the US House of Representatives. However, radical Republicans refused to seat former Confederates unless they took an oath denying that they had taken up arms against the federal government. Refusing to do so, Wofford returned to Georgia, where he served as a delegate to the state Democratic convention in 1876.

His greatest service, however, lay in advocating humanitarian and progressive reforms during Georgia's constitutional convention the following year. His support was critical in ensuring better treatment for former slaves, convicts and war veterans. Returning to his law practice and farm when the convention closed in August, Wofford died peacefully in his sleep on 22 May 1884.

Largely forgotten in the 20th century, Wofford and his contemporaries were part of a generation that, with the possible exception of World War II, produced the most formidable array of warriors in our history. Smith has produced a succinct biography.

COL Cole C. Kingseed, USA,  
US Military Academy,  
West Point, New York

## REFLECTIONS ON EUROPE

edited by Dennis L. Bark and Robert Conquest. 130 pages. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA. 1997. \$16.95.

*Reflections on Europe* is a compilation of five essays by distinguished authors from England, France, Germany and the United States, whose aim is to examine issues of concern to Europe and America in a post-Cold War world. Dennis L. Bark, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute, sets the stage with an overview of the half-century that defines the Cold War. Bark points out that the col-

lapse of the Soviet Union and its attendant communist threat complicates rather than simplifies issues facing the United States and Europe today. Predictability has been replaced by instability, and the margin for error in the conduct of foreign policy is greatly narrowed.

Robert Conquest's excellent essay on Russia, covering a range of policy issues from economics to the role of tradition, masterfully illustrates many of the paradoxes that have characterized Russia throughout history. His insight into the future course of Russian development is simultaneously sobering and hopeful. His recommendations on how the West can best help warrant consideration.

Dominique Moiesi, a French professor and avowed "Europeanist," succinctly lays out the fits and starts characteristic of efforts to further European integration in a slightly unbalanced manner in his essay, "A European Triangle: France, Germany and the United Kingdom," in which he also describes the frustrating equation unique to European political calculus:  $2+1=<2$ . While all parties receive a dose of Moiesi's criticism, the bulk is reserved for the British. Also missing from the otherwise comprehensive list of impediments to "completing the triangle" is any real discussion of the impact of welfare-state policies on both Germany and France—and Britain's refusal (out of a fear of similar economic contraction) to accept the terms of the European Union's (EU's) social charter.

*Reflections on Europe* deserves much credit for including a chapter on Turkish relations with Germany and the United States. Turkey stands at the crossroads of many of the most explosive challenges of the 21st century. Religious, cultural, ethnic, economic and political fault lines crisscross Turkey to an extent unmatched anywhere else. Turkey's handling of EU and NATO expansion, religious fundamentalism versus the Kemalist secular ideal and the question of Kurdish nationalism will largely frame the security environment for Central and Eastern Europe and the

Middle East well into the next century. Ludger Kuehnhardt points out the failures of all involved in finding a way into the EU for Turkey. Furthermore, he takes on the religious and racial components of the policies that have kept Turkey at arm's length in a way that makes it difficult to ignore. The only crucial issue Kuehnhardt fails to address is the question of Turkey's control of critical water resources in the region. This chapter is exceptional.

Henry S. Rowen closes with an essay about the future of the North Atlantic Alliance. The overall tone is firm and aims at reminding both Americans and Europeans of their shared struggle for half of the 20th century, for the values of classical liberalism described by F.A. Hayek 50 years ago—truth, moral decency, human freedom, democracy and the opposition of all forms of totalitarianism (from the Right or from the Left). From this comes the understanding that despite any differences that may exist, US security and European security can only be achieved if they are linked.

This book is more descriptive than prescriptive. There are few revelations for the intermediate "Europhile." However, the breadth and quality of coverage are remarkable for a work of this size; a better primer for those wishing to understand or join the debate on the future of US-European relations would be difficult to cite.


MAJ James F. Fain, USA,  
Command and General Staff College,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

**OVER LINCOLN'S SHOULDER:**  
**The Committee on the Conduct of the War** by Bruce Tap. 319 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1998. \$39.95.

Students of the American Civil War should welcome this well-researched study of the US Congress' Joint Select Committee on the Conduct of the War. While the committee is cited numerous times in general Civil War works, it has been left to Bruce Tap to present an authoritative work on the subject. Tap integrates the two major aspects of the committee's work—the attempt

to find scapegoats for military failure and the desire to further the members' political agendas.

At the outset of the war, the North expected a quick victory after a single battle. Instead, the Union Army was beaten at Bull Run in July 1861 and Ball's Bluff in October. In December, the committee began its work. However, it was handicapped by a membership that had no military experience and, thus, no understanding of the difficulties commanders faced on the scene. The committee's reports of military disas-



ters, alleged contract irregularities, ineptness in military departments, Confederate atrocities and the surrender terms Sherman proposed eventually filled eight volumes.

Tap goes beyond simply examining the committee's findings. He delves into the members' motives as well as President Abraham Lincoln's use of its activities for his own purposes. Tap provides a fair assessment of the committee investigations' positive results as well as the negative impact of observations colored by ignorance and politics. Too often, he points out, the committee focused on assigning blame rather than seeking solutions to problems. Also, guilt was too often assigned or forgiven based on the political ideology of the individual under investigation.


Historians have reached little consensus on the committee's value. Its reputation and effectiveness have remained a point of contention. The strength of Tap's work is his careful examination of the committee's

work. He impartially evaluates both sides' arguments. The result is a book well worth reading.

**LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA,**  
*Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

**PETE ELLIS: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880-1923**, by Dirk Anthony Ballendorf and Merrill L. Bartlett. 200 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1997. \$28.95.

One of the most important figures in shaping the modern US Marine Corps was a chronic alcoholic with no formal education beyond high school. The man never commanded in combat and never wore a rank higher than major. He died while on a mission that was a potential public-relations nightmare for his service. That man was Earl "Pete" Ellis. Perhaps as much as anyone else, Ellis' vision for the Corps was what enabled the Marines to transcend their role as mere shipboard police to become the world's premier amphibious force. For all his significance,



Ellis remains one of the most enigmatic figures in the Corps' history.

Dirk Ballendorf and Merrill Bartlett seek to dispel some of the mystery surrounding Ellis. They bring a unique blend of qualifications to their effort. Ballendorf is a professor of history and Micronesian studies at the University of Guam. His 30 years in Micronesia give him a special vantage point from which to investigate the curious circumstances of Ellis' death. Bartlett, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel, served on the US Naval Academy's

faculty and has written widely about the Corps' history.

Ellis entered the Marine Corps in 1901, a troubled time in the service's history, when many people felt the Corps was a redundant and unnecessary force plagued with tight budgets and manpower ceilings. Tedious and repetitive duty at sea and overseas led to severe alcohol abuse by officers and high desertion rates within enlisted ranks. Yet Ellis, a poorly educated young man from rural Kansas, determined to thrive in this environment.

The authors suggest two interrelated factors were key to Ellis' rise to prominence. One was fortuitous assignments; the other was exposure to the rising stars within the service's senior leadership. Ellis' Pacific assignments while he was a company grade officer sparked his interest in the region and exposed him to the problems of "advanced bases." In 1912, Ellis was assigned to the academic atmosphere of the Naval War College, where he began to write on the subject of advanced bases and their relation to *Plan Orange*, the contingency plan for a future war with Japan.

Eventually, Ellis' assignments led him into the mentorship of Major General John Lejeune. Ellis served as a brigade adjutant in Lejeune's 2d Division of the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I. Over time, Lejeune became well aware of Ellis' conspicuous intellectual talents and supported Ellis' idea that the Corps should reconfigure itself as an amphibious assault force. Thus, Ellis played a profound role in creating the force that stormed ashore at Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Iwo Jima during World War II.

The authors offer an entire chapter on Ellis' doctrinal legacy. Yet, this is primarily a book about a man and the questions that surround his life. Who sponsored his spy mission to the Central Pacific in 1923? How did he die? Did the Japanese kill him? The authors conclude Ellis' mission was approved at the highest level of Navy and Marine Corps leadership. As for who killed him, they believe Ellis was killed by his own "demons." The suspicious Japanese may have hastened his de-

mise with gifts of whiskey, but his Palauan mistress testified that, in the end, Ellis was consuming 300 bottles of beer a week. He had begun killing himself long before his trip to the Central Pacific.

In the book's preface, historian Alvin D. Coox writes, "Ellis could have lived in no time but his own, in no place but the United States and served in no military organization except the Marine Corps." Ballendorf and Bartlett's biography bears out this assertion. They have gone to considerable length to solve the questions about Ellis. Their evidence is convincing, if not absolutely conclusive. In answering these questions, they give us a fascinating account of a complex and unusual man and his service to the Marine Corps in a crucial period of its transition.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,  
*Combat Studies Institute,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

**FORT DONELSON'S LEGACY:** *War and Society in Kentucky and Tennessee, 1862-1863*, by Benjamin F. Cooling. 408 pages. The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxville, TN. 1997. \$38.00.

Most American Civil War histories of the Western Theater focus on the major campaigns and battles of the region in Tennessee from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson, then along the waterways to Shiloh church. They then examine the lethargic Union march toward Corinth and General Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg Campaign. Other accounts center on the events of Confederate General Braxton Bragg's march into Kentucky, the Tullahoma Campaign, the Battle of Chickamauga and the siege of Chattanooga. Rarely is there an attempt in one study to examine these battles and campaigns as if they were part of a single theater or to examine what transpired in the areas through which the armies had passed.

Not only does author Benjamin F. Cooling study the events of 1862 and 1863 from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River, he also focuses on one aspect that has received little coverage. While armies were marching and soldiers were fighting, other forces—guerrillas and

partisans—were at work. The "uncontrolled, unorganized popular violence against the advancing Yankee hordes" created problems for Union commanders with which they were ill-equipped to deal.

Many commanders believed extreme measures, to include execution, had to be taken against Southern civilians—criminals in the view of many Union soldiers—who participated in irregular warfare. The South countered by enacting the Partisan Ranger Act, but generals on both sides who had been trained at West Point disdained such tactics and could not accept units roaming the countryside without being controlled by regular army officers.

It is this "war in the shadows" on which Cooling focuses. He views Confederate unwillingness to accept partisan activities as being a lost opportunity to damage advancing Union columns and regain control of areas of Southern states through which those armies passed.

Union commanders worried about guerrilla activity against supply lines but realized that the increased foraging necessary for meeting their logistic demands meant increased civilian resistance and even more partisan attacks. The solution appeared to be increased Union garrisoning of key points, but that also had the direct effect of weakening the advancing armies.

Cooling concludes it was the shadow war, coupled with the slavery issue, which led to Union recognition that defeating Confederate armies was not enough. The war would not end until the Southern people's will to resist had been destroyed, even if that meant destroying homes and crops. Carl von Clausewitz reached a similar conclusion as to the criticality of national will to success or failure during the Napoleonic wars, but his work had not yet been translated into English. By war's end Lieutenant General William Tecumseh Sherman would add an American exclamation point to what Clausewitz had written.


Despite being tedious reading, Cooling's work succeeds in captur-

ing war's impact on civilian society and opens for study a heretofore unexamined aspect of Civil War history.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA,  
*Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

**GHOST OF WAR:** *The Sinking of the Awa maru and Japanese-American Relations, 1945-1995*, by Roger Dingman. 373 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1997. \$37.50.

This well-crafted study relates the story of "the greatest submarine error" in World War II—the 1 April 1945 sinking of the *Awa maru* in the Taiwan Straits. More than 2,000 people, mostly civilians, died in a



matter of minutes. This death toll was higher than for any commercial vessel sunk since 1916. Dingman's intention is to explain how and why the incident occurred and describe how the American and Japanese governments dealt with the sinking in the waning days of the Pacific War and during the occupation.

The book has three purposes: it tells a human story of individuals caught up in events not of their own making—who are much larger than themselves—and their later attempts to give their experiences meaning; it places the incident into the context of the larger story of recent Japanese-American relations; and it shows and explains the ways public memory forms and changes. Despite this tripartite purpose, the book is "first and foremost" about warfare. The author raises questions about

error, accident and friction in war and the ways memories differ from actual experience. He also tries to answer the question, "Can former enemies come to a common understanding or view of their mutual past so they may overcome it?"

Dingman masterfully traces the incident's course and shows why and how the sinking occurred. He briefly narrates the background to the *Awa maru's* voyage—the exchange and succor of the civilian internees. He also focuses on the reasons for the sinking and the way American submarine commanders were selected and rewarded, alluding to the problem the US Navy initially had in finding qualified submarine commanders. His treatment of the postwar settlement claims is concise and nuanced, examining the ways American and Japanese officials obfuscated the issues of responsibility and how they decided on an indemnity settlement for the survivors. Dingman also draws the reader's attention to, defines and explains the differences between individual morality and the morality of states and shows how they interacted in this case.


Dingman's treatment of the ways public memory is formed is more problematic, perhaps because the field itself is so new. His account of way the incident has been forgotten in the United States combines an appreciation for the ways public remembrance is shaped by matters not connected with historical truth—social and political needs, personal vanity and, to some extent, group thinking, with empathy for the major actors. In his treatment of the American public's memory of the Pacific War, he shows the ways it was influenced by interservice rivalry, the Cold War and popular culture.

The way the Japanese remember the *Awa maru* incident was also shaped by political necessity, Dingman found. It was first fashioned by an American decision made during the Pacific War and implemented during the occupation: separate the Japanese people from the militarists by portraying the former as victims of an unscrupulous band of men. Since then, the concept has been used by most of the

Japanese political spectrum to promote the image of Japan as a victim of war, martyred by numerous atrocities. Since 1952, it has also been used as a justification for close political, military and economic ties with the United States.

Overall, Dingman has written a successful book. His careful case study of the sinking and its aftermath demonstrates that error, accident and friction are still a large part of warfare. This well-written book should serve as a cautionary tale for those who would say the use of sophisticated information technology will completely eliminate these hazards to success.

Lewis Bernstein, *Combined Arms Center History Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*



**THE RELUCTANT SHERIFF:**  
**The United States After the Cold War**  
by Richard N. Haass. 148 pages. The Council on Foreign Relations. Distributed by Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC. 1997. \$34.95.

The end of the Cold War has left both theorists and practitioners of foreign policy groping for a new paradigm to govern US foreign policy. Richard N. Haass, both a theorist and practitioner, has provided a useful guide for the conduct of foreign policy in an era of what he calls "deregulation." In a world no longer "regulated" by superpower rivalry, the United States should seek to act as "sheriff." It should serve as the leader of a "posse" of like-minded states to regulate the peaceful settlement of disputes or take military action against an aggressor while retaining the capability to act

unilaterally when necessary. Composition of the posse would vary in accordance with the crisis at hand.

This doctrine of regulation would concentrate on the external actions of nations. It would seek to ensure nations act in accordance with the rule of law and standards of conduct the United States endorses. The United States would act, preferably in concert with others, to shape the behavior and capabilities of states to provide the necessary stability for political, economic and social development.

Underlying Haass' paradigm is the belief that an active foreign policy need not be prohibitively expensive. As sheriff, the goal of US policy would be to encourage the development of international institutions that could share the burdens of regulating international relations. Haass acknowledges, however, that even with the participation of other nations, the cost to the United States would continue to be significant. To be sheriff, the United States would have to be prepared to fund the instruments of its power to a level commensurate with its leadership role.

While Haass makes a compelling case for a policy of regulation, the problem remains that it may not be sufficiently inspiring. The sheriff/posse formula is a mechanism for managing crises. The central issue is discerning the motivating vision that will drive foreign policy in the post-Cold War world and thus garner support for long-term application. Containment is a strategy with a lofty goal—the defeat of an expansionist totalitarianism that threatens the existence of liberal capitalist democracy. Regulation is a strategy whose goal is simply a well-ordered world. This, in fact, may be the ideal state in which freedom may blossom in as yet darkened corners of the world. However, regulation may not serve to inspire the support that will lead to public willingness to resource its implementation. The ideas in this book are thought provoking, but the reader would do well to conduct further research on the subject.

MAJ Jeffrey L. Eberhardt, *USA, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*